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I. Introduction
Accompanying once thriving marine life are vast islands of
plastic swirling through the oceans, a product of discarded land and
ship-based waste. This floating plastic mass revolves around the
North Pacific subtropical gyre between San Francisco and Hawaii,
situated in an area of sluggish currents and slack winds.1 Marine
plastics wreak havoc on marine animal populations as the creatures
ingest and become entangled in the plastic pieces scattered
throughout the oceans.2 In addition to the impact on the marine
wildlife populations, marine debris negatively impacts human
health, tourism, the fishing industry, coastal communities, and can
cause serious damage to boats.3
Regulating marine debris at an international level presents
numerous challenges. The immensity of the ocean and the lack of
state jurisdiction beyond 200 miles off the coast make effective
enforcement of plastics dumping regulations very challenging. The
current regulatory system essentially leaves compliance with
international standards up to the good will of the captain of the
ship. Enforcement and compliance are delegated to individual
states, and regulated by the International Maritime Organization
(IMO).4 Although the IMO has enacted many rules, 5 violators are
not incentivized to comply, and largely feel free to discharge
without fear of being caught.
This Note will address the regulatory difficulties surrounding
the prevention of marine debris, and provide feasible
recommendations for various stakeholders in the international
arena. Though many different users of the ocean contribute to the
marine debris problem, this Note will focus on reforms to the
commercial shipping fleet. Regulating these cargo ships poses
1. Kenneth R. Weiss, Plague of Plastic Chokes the Seas, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2006),
http://www.latimes.com/search/la-me-ocean2aug02,0,6929363.story.
2. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TACKLING MARINE DEBRIS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 34
(2009).
3. Id. at 39.
4. See Int'l Maritime Org. [hereinafter IMO], Conventions, http://www.imo.
org/About/Conventions/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
5. See, e.g., IMO, COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL ON PORT RECEPTION FACILITIES (2d
ed. 1999) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL]; see also IMO, GUIDELINES FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ANNEX V OF MARPOL 73/78 (1997) [hereinafter ANNEX V
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES], available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/
Environment/ PollutionPrevention/Garbage/ Documents/ 317.pdf.
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unique challenges because they are at sea for long periods of time,
frequently have an international crew speaking multiple languages,
and are often registered under flag states with open registries and
lax enforcement, known as "flags of convenience."
Section II is an introduction to the background of the problem
of marine debris and the international regulation of marine debris.
This Note will argue that the glaring lack of compliance with Annex
V of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of
Ships, modified by the 1978 Protocol (MARPOL), is largely due to
the piecemeal enforcement structure and a culture of impunity.
Ensuring compliance with Annex V will not involve direct
enforcement of plastics dumping. Rather, compliance will require
working with member nations on a regional level to establish
incentives for compliance on the part of ship owners and operators.
Furthermore, Section III will analyze the existing regulatory
structure and propose practical solutions to close regulatory
loopholes. Specifically, the Section will assert that IMO should
create a centralized information clearinghouse for port state
inspections, place pressure on states under which ships are
registered (flag states) to disseminate educational information to
sailors, and encourage member states to publish garbage dumping
fees to work against the current race-to-the-bottom effect among
port operators.
II. Background of the Problem
A. Marine Debris and Plastics
Approximately four-fifths of marine trash comes from land-
based sources, while ocean-going vessels discharge one-fifth.6
Plastic trash presents a unique problem in that it takes centuries to
break down in the ocean.7 For example, a piece of plastic found in
an albatross stomach in 2005 bore a serial number traced to a World
War II seaplane shot down in 1944.8 Additionally, the amount of
plastic in the oceans is not decreasing. Despite heightened
regulation, in a five-year study conducted by Ocean Conservancy
that ended in 2007, results indicated that the accumulation of litter
6. Weiss, supra note 1. Much of the plastic from ships consists of synthetic
floats or other gear dumped to avoid the costs of disposal at port.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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on beaches in the United States is remaining constant. 9 Since this
plastic does not biodegrade, it gradually accumulates in the oceans,
wreaking havoc on marine populations and eventually washing up
on shore.
Plastics pose a serious threat to the marine environment.
Entanglement and ingestion of plastics are the two main causes of
mortality of marine species.10 Around 100,000 seals, sea lions,
whales, dolphins, other marine mammals, and sea turtles asphyxiate
or become entangled in plastic nets or other debris every year." On
the Midway Atoll, an isolated series of islands located halfway
between North America and Japan, albatross forage at sea and carry
back nourishment for their chicks on land. The albatross feed
hundreds of miles out at sea, frequently taking them into the heart
of the Eastern Pacific garbage patch.12 Out of the 500,000 albatross
chicks born at Midway each year, approximately 200,000 die, mainly
from dehydration and starvation.13 A two-year study showed that
chicks that died from those causes had twice the amount of plastic
in their stomachs as those that died for other reasons.14 Albatross
are not the only victims. An estimated one million seabirds
suffocate or become entangled in plastic nets or debris each year. 5
Human populations are also threatened by the presence of
marine plastics in the environment. When plastics break down into
fragments, the tiny pieces become concentrated with toxic
chemicals.16  Organic pollutants such as dichlorodiphenyl-
trichloroethane (DDT), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and other
oil-based pollutants known to cause birth defects and cancer in
humans are concentrated in many plastic fragments. 7 Mistaking
9. See S.B. SHEAVLY, NATIONAL MARINE DEBRIS MONITORING PROGRAM: FINAL
PROGRAM REPORT, DATA ANALYSIS & SUMMARY, OCEAN CONSERVANCY 2-3 (Sept.
2007), available at http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/marinelitter/publications/
docs/NMDMPREPORTOceanConservancy_2_.pdf.
10. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLEAN SHIPS, CLEAN PORTS, CLEAN OCEANS 332-33
(1995) [hereinafter NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL 2].
11. Weiss, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Charles Moore, Trashed: Across the Pacific Ocean, Plastics, Plastics Everywhere,
112 NATURAL HISTORY (2003), available at http://www.mindfully.org/Plastic/
Ocean/ Moore-Trashed-PacificNov03.htm.
17. Id.
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the plastics for zooplankton, marine animals eat the toxic plastic
particles and absorb the pollutants into their blood streams and
hormone receptors.18 These toxins work their way up the food chain
as larger animals and humans consume the fish.19
Marine plastics have gained attention as the primary
component of the Eastern and Western Pacific garbage patches, a
vast area where marine debris converges. 20 The Eastern Pacific
garbage patch lies within the North Pacific subtropical gyre, a
region between Hawaii and California.21 Though estimates vary
widely as to the exact location and size of the patch, many studies
estimate it to be about twice the size of Texas. 22 In the Eastern
Pacific Garbage Patch, plastic is so prevalent that it outweighs
surface zooplankton by a factor of six to one. 23 One piece of plastic
caught in the Northern Pacific gyre can swirl for decades. 24 As the
plastic winds its way through the ocean, it breaks down into smaller
particles, which remain just below the water's surface.25 These
pieces, the primary component of the garbage patch, are often
invisible to the human eye.26
B. IMO and MARPOL
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a specialized
agency of the United Nations created in 1948 to establish uniform
international regulation of the maritime industry.27 IMO initially
focused on passing regulations focused on vessel safety, but major
pollution events led to the passage of MARPOL. 28 MARPOL is the
18. Id.; see Algalita Marine Research Foundation, Plastic Debris from Rivers to Sea
[hereinafter Algalita], available at http://www.algalita.org/pdf/PLASTICDEBRIS
ENGLISH.pdf.
19. Algalita, supra note 18.
20. Nat'1 Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Marine Debris, http://marine debris.
noaa.gov/info/patch.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Marine Debris].
21. Id.
22. Weiss, supra note 1.
23. Algalita, supra note 18.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Marine Debris Info, supra note 16.
27. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 52.
28. IMO, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Internation
al-Convention-for-the-Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx.
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primary international convention addressing the prevention of
pollution of the marine environment by ships.29 Currently, 150
member nations have ratified MARPOL,30 representing
approximately ninety-nine percent of the gross tonnage distributed
across the world.3' Member nations are not bound simply by
signing the convention.32 Similar to other international conventions,
member nations must implement domestic legislation to comply
with MARPOL's mandate.33
MARPOL further contains six operational annexes, addressing
the prevention of pollution by oil (Annex I), control of pollution by
noxious liquid substances in bulk (Annex II), prevention of
pollution by harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form
(Annex III), prevention of pollution by sewage from ships (Annex
IV), prevention of pollution by garbage from ships (Annex V), and
prevention of air pollution by ships (Annex VI).34 This Note limits
its discussion to Annex V regarding discharges of garbage, but
recognizes that only by implementing a comprehensive regulatory
scheme to address all six Annexes will the health of the oceans be
ensured.
Annex V creates a disposal scheme for the discharge of garbage
from ships at sea35 and is currently ratified by 139 member nations. 36
Garbage is defined as:
all kinds of victual, domestic, and operational waste excluding
fresh fish and parts thereof, generated during the normal
operation of the ship and liable to be disposed of continuously or
periodically except those substances which are defined or listed in
29. Id.; see also IMO, London Convention: Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
http:// www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/Pages/Dump
ing-of-Wastes-and-Other-Matter.aspx (addressing discharges from ships).
30. IMO, Status of Conventions, http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/
StatusOfConventions/ Pages/ Default.aspx (click on "Status of Conventions
Summary" to download the attached file).
31. IMO, Pollution Prevention, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/
PollutionPrevention/ Pages/Default.aspx.
32. Dr. Z. Oya Ozgayir, The Use of Port State Control in Maritime Industry and
Application of the Paris MOU, 14 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 201, 204 (2009).
33. Id.
34. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 52.
35. Id. at 53.
36. Status of Conventions, supra note 30.
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other Annexes to the present convention.37
There is an absolute ban on the dumping of plastics, including
synthetic ropes, fishing nets and plastic garbage bags.38 Annex V
specifies the distance from land from which various other wastes
may be disposed, as well as the manner of disposal.39 Rather than
ecosystem considerations, the distances (three, twelve, and twenty-
five nautical miles) are based on historical definitions of state,
territorial seas, and international waters, and therefore do not
account for the impacts of garbage upon the marine environment.40
In response, a number of "Special Areas" have been established
based on unique ecological and oceanographical considerations,
which significantly increase the distance from shore that certain
types of garbage can be dumped.41
Similar to other international conventions, IMO has
promulgated a voluntary set of guidelines, which can be used by
nations in developing legislation for the implementation of
MARPOL Annex V.42 The requirements of MARPOL are written in
broad, sweeping language, while the guidelines detail specific
methods to reach compliance. These guidelines describe matters
such as port reception facilities, effective implementation of Annex
V, and incinerator specifications for ships.43  States devising
implementing legislation for MARPOL are encouraged to look to
the guidelines for specific guidance on complex issues.44
The Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), an
IMO committee that meets to develop and amend international
conventions and regulations, has turned its focus towards the
inadequacy of existing port reception facilities to accept waste
discharge from ships.45 The MARPOL Guidelines state that:
[A]dequate facilities can be defined as those which ... fully meet
37. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships Annex
V, Reg. 1(1), Nov. 2, 1972, 12 ILM 1319 [hereinafter MARPOL].
38. Id. reg. 3(1)(a).
39. Id. reg. 3(1).
40. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 54-55.
41. MARPOL, supra note 37, at Annex V, reg. 5.
42. See ANNEX V IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 5.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. IMO, Port Reception Facilities, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environ
ment/ PollutionPrevention/PortReceptionFacilities/ Pages/Default.aspx.
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the needs of the ships regularly using them; do not provide
mariners with a disincentive to use them; and contribute to the
improvement of the marine environment.46
In addition, the Comprehensive Manual on Port Reception Facilities,
a non-binding publication issued by IMO, encourages states to take
responsible action on the issue of the adequacy of port reception
facilities because the establishment of waste management standards
and effluent standards are not within MARPOL.47
The MEPC has also recognized that governments should not
simply look to the adequacy of port reception facilities, but should
also consider the technological problems associated with the
treatment and ultimate disposal of garbage. 48 The Comprehensive
Manual on Port Reception Facilities recognizes that "states'
responsibilities don't end at establishing 'adequate' port reception
facilities - UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea] requires proper treatment and disposal of these wastes, along
with land-generated wastes." 49  Port reception facilities are
ineffective if the off-loaded garbage subsequently ends up in the
ocean through improper land-based waste management practices.
MARPOL also mandates that ship operators establish
procedures to track waste discharge while at sea. Under Regulation
9 of Annex V, which came into effect in 1995, ships over 400 gross
tons are required to maintain a garbage management plan, which
lays out written procedures for the collection, storage, processing,
and disposal of all garbage generated onboard.50 Garbage record
books are also mandatory under Regulation 9, requiring ship
operators to provide a written record of all garbage discharges and
incineration at sea including the date, time, position of the vessel,
and description of the type of garbage discharged or incinerated.51
A template for the garbage record book is included as an appendix
46. IMO, Guidelines For Ensuring The Adequacy of Port Waste Reception Facilities,
MEPC Res. 83(44) § 3.2 (Mar. 23, 2000) [hereinafter IMO Guidelines].
47. COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL, supra note 5, at 23.
48. Id. at 20.
49. Id. at 18.
50. Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 65/37 (1995)
[hereinafter Amendments], available at http://www.amsa.gov.au/ Marine_
EnvironmentProtection/Revision of_Annexes_I_and_II_ofMARPOL/65-37.pdf.
51. Id.
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to MARPOL Annex V.52 Ship owners must also post placards to
notify passengers and crew of the disposal requirements of the
regulation.53 These requirements are designed to compel ship
owners to track and provide accurate records of garbage disposal to
coastal authorities; yet their impact on compliance is minimal
because of the procedural ease in maintaining some form of record
without altering unlawful garbage discharge practices.
C. Port State Enforcement
Port states possess the ability to enforce pollution-prevention
laws against those ships that visit their ports. Port state control
involves the "powers and concomitant obligations vested in,
exercised by, and imposed upon a national maritime authority (or
its delegee) by international convention or domestic statute or
both."54 MARPOL allows port state control officers to inspect a
foreign-flagged vessel where there are grounds for believing that the
crew is not familiar with shipboard procedures relating to the
prevention of pollution from garbage.55 MARPOL additionally
allows a ship to be detained until the situation is rectified.56 When
observed deficiencies lead to detention, the flag state must be
informed immediately in order to allow an opportunity to intervene
in favor of the owner or operator.57
The United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) provides important jurisdictional guidelines for port
state enforcement and MARPOL.58 Article 228(1) of UNCLOS
52. See MARPOL, supra note 37, at Annex V.
53. Id. at Annex V, reg. 9. See IMO, Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships,
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/Garbage/Pag
es/Default.aspx.
54. John Hare, Port State Control: Strong Medicine to Cure a Sick Industry, 26 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 571, 572 (1996-1997).
55. Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships, supra note 53.
56. Id.
57. Doris Konig, Port State Control: An Assessment of European Practice, in MARINE
IsSUES: FROM A SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 37, 43 (Peter Ehlers et
al. eds., 2002).
58. "UNCLOS was a significant step in a different direction with respect to
environmental law pertaining to the global commons for the world. In particular,
UNCLOS precludes the view of the oceans and seas as an open dumping grounds
for anyone choosing to do so." Benedict Sheehy, International Marine Environment
Law: A Case Study in the Wider Caribbean Region, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 448
(2003-2004).
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mandates that proceedings taken against a foreign ship must be
suspended if the flag state institutes proceedings within six months
after the original charges were initiated. 59 Additionally, Article 217
addresses the enforcement of international rules and standards by
flag states and provides that such enforcement must take place
"irrespective of where a violation occurs." 60 Thus, flag states are the
primary enforcers of international rules and can effectively
supersede a port state's jurisdiction and dismiss any pending
actions brought by that port state. Effective flag state enforcement is
therefore crucial in order to carry out MARPOL's mandate of
eliminating the discharge of plastics into the ocean.
D. Flag State Enforcement and Flags of Convenience
The enforcement of MARPOL relies primarily on the exercise of
flag state jurisdiction. 61 Violations of MARPOL Annex V are
sanctioned under the law of the administration of the ship,
wherever the violation occurs.62 The flag state possesses ultimate
responsibility for the enforcement and sanction of offenders and the
penalties "shall be adequate in severity to discharge violations of the
present Convention and shall be equally severe irrespective of
where the violation occurs." 63 Therefore, a ship can largely evade
MARPOL's requirements if a flag state cannot or will not enforce
violations of international law.
Flags of convenience (FOC)64 refers to a common practice of
states using open registries, which allow ship owners to register
their vessels under the flag of a foreign country with which they
have little to no ties.65 A lack of administrative machinery or power
to effectively impose any government or international regulation is
59. IMO SECRETARIAT, IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, Leg/Misc.6 53
(2008), available at http://www.imo.org/ourwork/legal/documents/6.pdf.
60. Id. at 54.
61. Id. at 52.
62. MARPOL, supra note 37, art. 4, § 4.
63. Id.
64. The International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF) maintains a list of
thirty-two FOC states worldwide. Int'l Transp. See Worker's Fed'n, What are Flags
of Convenience? http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/sub-page.cfm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2012).
65. Mark L. Boos, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Striking the Flags of Convenience?,
2 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 407, 407 (1991).
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commonly associated with FOC, placing a larger burden on port
states to enforce these regulations because of the lack of FOC
enforcement. 66 Over one third of all ships throughout the world are
registered under FOC.67 The decision where to flag a vessel usually
stems from economic rather than political or geographical
considerations 68 and FOC states provide less stringent enforcement
of environmental regulations, thereby giving ship owners the
economic advantage of lower labor rates, relaxed safety standards
and lower foreign tax rates.69 The largest FOC states are Liberia,
Panama, Malta, the Bahamas, and Antigua. 70 Of the thirty-two FOC
states identified by the International Transport Worker's Federation,
ten are listed on the Paris MOU's black list (see infra), which
indicates a "very high" or "high" risk of inspection violations.'
FOC are often cited as a major cause of environmental
pollution. 72 Lack of regulation and inexpensive, untrained labor are
the two major reasons for the disproportionately negative
environmental impact of ships registered under FOC.73 Because a
flag state maintains the responsibility for implementation and
issuance of appropriate certificates, ship owners have little incentive
to comply with MARPOL Annex V when regulations are not
enforced.74  IMO has identified flag state enforcement and
implementation of international agreements as a strong impediment
to the effectiveness of conventions such as MARPOL, and has
convened a Subcommittee on Flag State Implementation (FSI) to
66. G.P. PAMBORIDES, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING LAW: LEGISLATION AND
ENFORCEMENT 10 (1999).
67. Boos, supra note 65, at 412.
68. Margaret G. Wachenfeld, Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers: A U.S. Response in the
Persian Gulf, 1988 DUKE L.J. 174, 177 (1988).
69. Rebecca Becker, Note, MARPOL 73/78: An Overview in Environmental
Enforcement, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 625, 632 (1998) (citing Jeff B. Curtis, Vessel-
Source Oil Pollution and MARPOL 73/78: An International Success Story?, 15 ENVTL. L.
679, 708 (1985)).
70. See The World Factbook, CIA.gov, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/ the-world-factbook (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) (noting figures for these
countries).
71. See the ITF list, supra note 64; see also THE PARIS MOU ON PORT STATE
CONTROL, PORT STATE CONTROL: IN THE OFFING, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, available at
http://parismou.org/Publications/Annual-reports/.
72. See generally Bill Shaw, Brenda J. Winslett, & Frank B. Cross, The Global
Environment: A Proposal to Eliminate Marine Oil Pollution, 27 NAT. RES. J. 157 (1987).
73. Id. at 185.
74. PAMBORIDES, supra note 66, at 59.
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address the issue.75 This subcommittee seeks to identify and correct
the negligence of many flag states and encourage enforcement of
international conventions. 76 However, the subcommittee has made
little progress in curtailing the failure of FOC to enforce
international agreements.77
Full Annex V compliance cannot be realized if flag states are
not effectively enforcing international conventions. Concurrently, a
key component of Annex V compliance, the education of crew and
captains of discharge requirements, will not occur if flag states do
not provide the necessary resources and ensure that education
materials are widely used. FOC place a heavy burden upon port
states to enforce international convention standards when the real
responsibility should be placed upon the flag state.78
E. Regional Memorandums of Understanding
Regional Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) further
coordinate enforcement of international regulations. These
administrative agreements are subscribed to and executed by
maritime authorities of the party states in a cooperative
framework.79 MOUs are not binding international conventions80
and do not establish new standards or enforce requirements on
foreign vessels beyond the international conventions agreed upon in
the MOU.81 The establishment of the MOU simply shows the will of
the participating authorities to orchestrate similar procedures for
carrying out inspections, exchange of gathered information, and
implementation of the relevant instruments. 82 There are currently
nine regional port State control regime MOUs worldwide.83
75. PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 76 (3d ed. 2009); see also U.S. COAST GUARD, Revised Terms of
Reference of the Subcommittees [hereinafter U.S. COAST GUARD], available at
http://www.uscg.mil/imo/docs/terms-of-ref.pdf.
76. U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 75, at 6-7.
77. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 75, at 76.
78. Ozgayir, supra note 32, at 201.
79. Id. at 210.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 212.
82. PAMBORIDES, supra note 66, at 67.
83. See JOHN N. K. MANSELL, FLAG STATE RESPONSIBILITY: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 148 n.95 (2010) ("Paris MOU, 1982;
Acuerdo de Vina del Mar, 1992; Tokyo MOU, 1993; Caribbean MOU, 1996;
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The model for these MOUs is the Paris MOU, which was
adopted in 1982 as a regional cooperative agreement to address the
safety of life at sea, living and working conditions aboard ships, and
the prevention of pollution from ships.84  There are currently
twenty-seven participating maritime administrations acting through
a coordinated system of port state control85 that encompass the
waters of the European coastal states and the North Atlantic basin
from North America to Europe. 86 MARPOL has been designated a
relevant instrument by the Paris MOU, and thus a component of the
Paris MOU's enforcement scheme.87
The Paris MOU is a system of port state control designed to
target substandard ships.88  A number of different inspection
regimes are in place, depending upon a ship's past inspection record
and ship-risk profile calculation, a measure taking into account a
ship's previous inspection record and flag state, among other
factors.89 Port state control officers conduct their inspection based
upon the applicable international conventions. 90 Ships can be
detained or banned depending on the results of the inspection.91
Member states are required to compile and send the results of their
inspections to the central processing system in France.92 In the case
Mediterranean MOU, 1997; Indian Ocean MOU, 1998; West and Central African
MOU, 1999; Black Sea MOU, 2000; Riyadh MOU, 2004."). For an overview of the
different regimes, see Dr. Heike Hoppe, Port State Control - an update on IMO's work,
IMO NEWS, Jan. 2000, at 9, http://www5.imo.org/sharepoint/main
frame.asp?topic id=406&doc id=1079.
84. The Paris MOU on Port State Control, History, http://parismou.org/
Organization/ About-us/2010.12.28/ History.htm [hereinafter History].
85. Ozgayir, supra note 32, at 210.
86. History, supra note 84.
87. The Paris MOU on Port State Control, Instruments, http://parismou.org/
Organization/ Aboutus/ 2010.12.28/ Instruments.htm.
88. The Paris MOU on Port State Control, Organization, http://parismou.org/
Organization.
89. The Paris MOU on Port State Control, Inspection Types, http://paris
mou.org/Inspection-efforts/Inspections/Inspection-types/ For example, an oil
tank ship that is older than twelve years and is registered under a "high risk" flag is
considered a "High Risk Ship," whereas if that same ship were registered under a
"medium risk" flag it would be considered a "Standard Risk Ship."
90. The Paris MOU on Port State Control, Initial Inspection, http://paris
mou.org/Inspection-efforts/Inspections/Inspection-types/Initial-inspection/.
91. Id.
92. The Paris MOU on Port State Control, § 3.7, http://parismou.org/
Organization/2010.12.27/Memorandum ofUnderstand ing.htm [hereinafter Paris
MOU].
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of a detention, the member state must immediately notify the flag
state and rely upon the flag state to effectively punish the detained
vessel. 93
The Paris MOU publishes an annual report compiling the
results of the comprehensive inspection regime.94  Annex V
violations, stemming from the lack of a garbage log or garbage
management plan, are listed.95 The most recently published report
indicated that in 2010, 0.95% of inspected ships had Annex V
deficiencies. 96 Despite the seemingly low number, even if only one
in one hundred ships improperly dispose of garbage into the ocean,
the sheer quantity of garbage and plastics from those ships would
be staggering.
III. Proposed Solutions to the Difficulties of Regulating the
Discharge of Marine Debris
Because the ocean spans millions of miles, direct enforcement of
international environmental agreements relating to the discharge of
trash is impracticable. As laid out above, the current regulatory
structure for marine debris does not comprehensively address the
root causes of its discharge - the ability to discharge without being
caught. MARPOL recognizes the need to provide incentives to
discharge trash at port reception facilities.97 However, this goal is
not realized on a comprehensive international level because port
states operators do not consistently enforce international
regulations. IMO does not have a process for effectively dealing
with non-compliance issues;98 therefore IMO needs to spur
dialogues and agreements between port states. This Section will
address some of the structural problems that prevent effective
enforcement of MARPOL Annex V, and it will propose a number of
Key Solutions that respond to the current deficiencies.
93. Id.
94. See THE PARIS MOU ON PORT STATE CONTROL, PORT STATE CONTROL: VOYAGE
COMPLETED, A NEW HORIZON AHEAD, ANNUAL REPORT 2010 [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT 2010], available at http://parismou.org/Publications/Annual-reports
(follow "Annual Report 2010" hyperlink).
95. Id.; see also annex 10 of Paris MOU, supra note 92.
96. ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra, note 94.
97. ANNEx V IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 5, reg. 7.2.1.
98. BIRNIE, supra note 75, at 409.
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A. Key Solutions
IMO should:
Compile information from regional MOUs about ship
compliance records and pending enforcement actions into
the GISIS to provide a reliable, centralized information
source for port states.
Actively publicize those port reception facilities that are
inadequate under MARPOL standards.
Convene a subcommittee to adopt common standards for
port reception facilities that are enforceable against member
states.
- Convene a subcommittee to conduct a comprehensive study
on MARPOL Annex V compliance and enforcement.
Convene a subcommittee to draft an Annex V Regulation
that addresses the specific technical requirements needed to
obtain an "adequate" port reception facility.
- Encourage port state enforcement by further defining "undue
delay" in MARPOL Article 7.
Regional MOUs should:
- Standardize and enforce fines against ships that do not
maintain a garbage log, garbage management plan, or post
placards where required.
Standardize charges for garbage disposal to reduce uncertain
costs and incentivize lawful garbage discharge.
Establish a penalty system for member states that do not
maintain adequate port reception facilities.
Place political and economic pressure on member states not
providing adequate garbage reception facilities.
B. Port State Operators Lack a Reliable Information Source for
Noncompliant Flag States and Ships
Port operators do not have access to a reliable and
comprehensive source for information on noncompliant ships and
flag states. Regulating marine debris at a portside level involves
checking that a garbage log is being maintained and that ships
carrying over fifteen passengers have a garbage management plan.99
Although inspection of these two documents rarely leads to direct
99. Amendments, supra note 50, at 9(2) and 9(3).
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evidence of garbage dumping, the inspection process demands
procedural compliance, thereby forcing ship operators to at least
consider alternatives to dumping garbage into the ocean.
When inspecting a ship, port state inspectors are conducting the
inspection blindly, with no knowledge about the ship's previous
deficiencies. Port state inspectors have such little time aboard the
ship that every second is crucial.100 If port state inspectors are able
to access previous inspection records for a ship on demand, the
inspection process will be significantly more effective. The
inspectors will be able to focus their time on affirming that past
deficiencies have been corrected. For example, if one state refers a
violation to the flag state for not possessing a comprehensive
garbage management plan,10 a state official at another port of call
will be able to enter the inspection with that knowledge,
concentrating their efforts on previously recognized violations. This
model is based on the Paris MOU's use of a centralized data
clearinghouse, which allows for port state operators to obtain
information about a ship's inspection record in other Paris MOU
member nations.
Compared with other regional agreements, the Paris MOU has
always been the strictest port state control program.102 The Paris
MOU compiles a wealth of information on their website, including a
list of previous ship inspections, detentions, and bannings. 103 It also
publishes an annual report detailing violation records. 104  In
addition, the organization classifies flag states as low risk, medium
risk, or high risk, depending on the frequency of violations and
detentions. 05  The Paris MOU has recently adopted a new
inspection regime, which takes into consideration a ship's age, type,
flag performance, organization, International Ship Management
100. Id. at Annex V, reg. 7(1). The Port of Rotterdam recognizes the need for
speedy discharge of garbage, and has thus invested significant resources into
streamlining the garage discharge process once a boat enters the port. PORT OF
ROTTERDAM, Any Waste, Any Time, http://www.portofrotterdam.com/nl/Over-de-
haven/ Haven-in-beeld/ video/ Pages/ default.aspx?videold =27.
101. As required by MARPOL, Annex V, reg. 9(2). See MARPOL, supra note 37.
102. Ozqayir, supra note 32, at 217.
103. The Paris MOU on Port State Control, Welcome to Paris MOU,
http://parismou.org [hereinafter Welcome to Paris MOLT].
104. ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 94.
105. Id.
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agency, and number of deficiencies and detentions.106 Low-risk
ships are rewarded with longer intervals between inspections. 07
The goal of a centralized information clearinghouse is to name
and shame flag states and ship operators into compliance with
international treaty obligations. 08 The names of the ship owner and
classification society, as well as the name and address of the initial
charterer of a ship carrying bulk cargoes, are collected by the Paris
MOU's information clearinghouse.109 The ranking system results in
direct pressure on the flag state to comply with their international
obligations.n 0 The policy also promotes effective implementation
because the consistent targeting of a specific flag could result in a
reduction in tonnage of that flag, reducing its revenue."
Classification societies and charterers must also consider the effects
of port state control for the same reasons, as ships targeted by
extensive inspections and costly delays may reregister.112 The Paris
MOU publishes a list of vessels detained, as well as "Detained
Vessels in the Spotlight," thereby publicly calling on the flag state to
amend its oversight practices." 3  Effective flag state oversight
mechanisms like these will lead to better garbage management
practices through education of the public and crew, and more
effective supervision of garbage management practices.
In an article on port state control, Maritime Law Consultant Dr.
Oya Ozqayir argues that a potential difficulty of port state control is
its ease of employment as a political tool to criticize certain flag
states for not complying with international conventions." 4 The risk
of port state enforcement turning into a geopolitical game of
showmanship, however, is likely unfounded. Port state inspections
and detentions are a minor inconvenience, and if vessels from a
106. Press Release: Paris MOU inspection regime launched in two weeks time
(Dec. 14, 2010), http://parismou.org/Publications/Press-releases [hereinafter
Press Release] (search by year and month to access press release).
107. Id.
108. Ozgayir, supra note 32, at 217. New 2011 regulations calculate company
performance criteria into the ship risk profile calculator. See Press Release, supra
note 106.
109. Ozgayir, supra note 32, at 217.
110. PAMBORIDES, supra note 66, at 70.
111. Id.
112. Ozgayir, supra note 32, at 217.
113. See History, supra note 84.
114. Ozgayir, supra note 32, at 238.
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certain flag are unfairly detained or discriminated against,
shipowners can bring a claim against the port state for undue
delay.115 Article 7 of MARPOL specifies that ships unduly delayed
shall be entitled to compensation for any loss or damage suffered. 116
However, "undue delay" is not defined and subject to the
interpretation of each captain, 117 thereby reducing incentives for
port states to conduct thorough inspections for fear of having a
claim filed against them.
The IMO currently operates the Global Integrated Shipping
Information System (GISIS), a database that details the port
reception facilities at major ports throughout the world.118 It also
provides reports and comments on deficient discharge facilities. 119
Although IMO lacks effective enforcement power for debris
discharges, its ability to disseminate information complements its
ability to publicize violations. Data relating to the port reception
facilities is far from complete though. The ambitious inspection
database maintained by the Paris MOU could complement the
IMO's port reception facility database. In this way, when port state
inspectors board vessels, they are able to focus attention on
documented substandard operational equipment, garbage sorting
receptacles, placards, or certificates. IMO should utilize the Paris
MOU's existing data and model to generate a similar system. By
granting port reception facilities and ship operators access to the
site, a real-time model of inspection records could be utilized,
ultimately leading to a reduction in the amount of garbage dumped
into the oceans.
IMO should also compile inspection information from the nine
regional MOUs into the GISIS system. Port states could then have
access to a greater knowledge base of offending ships. This pooled
knowledge would also allow IMO to document effective port state
control. With this information, IMO should conduct studies and
create recommendations for regional MOUs to ensure compliance
with MARPOL's regulations.
115. See MARPOL, supra note 37, art. 7.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. IMO, Global integrated Shipping Information System, http://gisis.imo.org/
Public/ Default.aspx (follow "Port Reception Facilities" link (requires registration)).
119. Id.
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C. Lack of Standardized Port Reception Facilities
The lack of standardized port reception facilities is a major
contributor to the poor disposal behavior of the commercial
shipping fleet. When the availability, functionality, and cost of
garbage reception facilities are uncertainties, ship operators are
more likely to take the easy route of discharging at sea.
MARPOL requires ports to ensure adequate port reception
facilities. 120 Yet, because port state operators do not want to be
viewed as having prohibitively expensive reception facilities, there
has always been a "race to the bottom." 121 For example, common
perceptions among ship operators that the United States' port
reception facilities are too expensive push the ship operators to
either discharge their garbage at other ports or dump it into the
ocean.122
The IMO Guidelines for Ensuring the Adequacy of Port Waste
Reception Facilities define adequate facilities as those that "do not
provide mariners with a disincentive to use them."123  The
Guidelines further suggest that unreasonably high costs can deter
the use of port reception facilities. 124 IMO has also published the
Comprehensive Manual on Port Reception Facilities, which
complements the Guidelines. 125  These two documents detail
proposed methods to comply with the MARPOL Guidelines.126
Unfortunately, the documents languish as suggested compliance
mechanisms and are not enforceable against member states.
Port states do not possess incentives to establish adequate port
reception facilities when funds for improvements are scarce and
enforcement of port reception facility standards is nonexistent. The
Comprehensive Manual recognizes that adequate port reception
facilities at a regional level are crucial for actual compliance.127
Ensuring that each port state has proper reception facilities for
120. ANNEX V IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 24.
121. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL 2, supra note 10, at 166 n.19.
122. Id. at 166.
123. ANNEX V IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 5, § 3.2.
124. Id. § 5.2; see also IMO, GUIDE To GOOD PRACTICE FOR PORT RECEPTION FACILITY
PROVIDERS AND USERS (2009), available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/
Environment/ PollutionPrevention/ PortReceptionFacilities/Documents/ 671.pdf.
125. See COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL, supra note 5.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 23.
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garbage in a given region prevents one port from carrying the
burden for the whole region and protects against creating incentives
for ships to illegally discharge their garbage into the water.128
To ameliorate the lack of standardized port facilities, IMO
should more actively publicize those facilities that are inadequate
under MARPOL standards. By publicly denouncing states without
adequate port reception facilities, neighboring ports will likely
recognize the unfair burden of disposal and environmental
degradation placed on them. Public pressure upon the
noncompliant states will lead them to acknowledge the need for
proper reception facilities. The GISIS, mentioned supra, is a strong
step in this direction. The GISIS can be strengthened as an
information source by including the costs of garbage discharge in
the information database.
IMO should also adopt minimum common standards for port
reception facilities that are enforceable against port states. A
subcommittee should be convened to draft an additional regulation
for Annex V that addresses the specific technical requirements
needed to obtain an "adequate" port reception facility. The
subcommittee should identify specific challenges associated with
inadequate garbage reception facilities and propose the most
effective and lowest-cost methods for garbage management.
Regional MOUs should standardize charges for garbage
disposal to reduce the uncertainty of costs, thereby discouraging a
race to the bottom among ports within a region.129  The
Comprehensive Manual on Port Reception Facilities recognizes that by
establishing adequacy at a regional level, one port or country does
not share an unfair burden.130 Regional MOUs are given the
flexibility to best determine how to assess fees for garbage
discharge. IMO should also capitalize on its role as an international
institution to provide economic incentives for states to enter into
regional agreements such as the Paris MOU, in order to standardize
port reception facilities at a regional level.
Port states that are party to regional MOUs can also pool their
shared knowledge to create a discharge system that is efficient and
inexpensive for each state. Portside officers, marine engineers,
128. Id.
129. IMO Guidelines, supra note 46, § 5.2.
130. COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL, supra note 5, at 23.
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dockside workers, ship crew, captains, and others involved in the
proper functioning of a port facility should be tasked with
discussing discharge issues at a logistical, on-the-ground level.
With the knowledge gained from these dialogues, members of
regional agreements should publish manuals and convene regular
dialogues on technology and possible regulatory improvements
related to garbage discharge.
Furthermore, regional MOUs could establish a penalty system
when one member state does not comply with its obligation to
maintain adequate port reception facilities. A monetary or trade
sanction recognizes that if one port state's reception facilities are not
adequate, the entire region has to bear the cost of increased usage of
their garbage facilities and the concomitant environmental
degradation from dumping when there are not adequate reception
facilities. These sanctions would have to be agreed upon in the
terms of the MOU, and would have to be voluntarily assented to
because of the nonbinding nature of a regional MOU. Economic
sanctions are not likely to gain strong political approval unless the
problems surrounding marine debris are recognized as a threat to
environmental health, so as to catalyze political action. Regional
MOUs are more nimble organizations than IMO and are able to
spark political allegiances by appealing to the unique and shifting
needs of their member states.
D. Lack of Enforcement by Flag States
States are not adequately enforcing the international
requirements of Annex V against ships registered under their flag.
In general, the enforcement of international conventions presents
difficult problems: conventions can take a long time to integrate into
the national legal system of the state;131 there might be
inconsistencies between the convention and the implementing
legislation;132 or implementation of a convention may not be a
priority of the signatory state.133  This disconnect between
ratification and implementation of international conventions is
evidenced by the large number of violations catalogued by the Paris
MOU.134
131. Ozqayir, supra note 32, at 204.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Welcome to Paris MOU, supra note 103.
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MARPOL enforcement relies almost exclusively upon flag
states to sanction and remedy the violations they receive from port
states that document infringements.s35 When a coastal state detects
an alleged violation, it is required to either take action under its own
laws or forward the case to the flag state for consideration.136 But
when an offense occurs in international waters, the responsibility for
imposing the penalty lies with the flag state.137 In the case of
garbage discharge, detecting violations in international waters is
nearly impossible, so the true enforcement lies in the regular
maintenance of a garbage record book and the construction of a
viable garbage management plan, which are dependent upon flag
state enforcement. International regulations are essentially
voluntary without flag state enforcement.
Shipowners currently violate MARPOL with impunity because
of ineffective enforcement of regulations.s38 Experience dictates that
if shipowners find laws objectionable, they will seek legal methods
to evade the laws provided that no negative consequences will
result.139 Simply referring alleged violations to flag states has not
resulted in significant action. A 2000 Government Accountability
Office Report on cruise ship marine pollution indicated that when
the Coast Guard referred violations to flag states, the response rate
was dismal.140 The Coast Guard received no information at all about
eleven of the seventeen cases from 1993 to 1995, one ship was fined
an unknown sum, and another ship was to be "surveyed," although
the flag state indicated it had a "reasonable doubt" about the
incident. In the final four cases, the flag state indicated it would
take no action whatsoever.141
These cases illustrate the fact that national governments have
135. See MARPOL, supra note 37, art. 7.
136. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-48, PROGRESS MADE TO
REDUCE MARINE POLLUTION BY CRUISE SHIPS, BUT IMPORTANT ISSUES REMAIN 20 (2000)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
137. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
138. Gerard Peet, International Co-operation to Prevent Oil Spills at Sea: Not Quite
the Success It Should Be, in GREEN GLOBE YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 1994, at 41, 49 (Helge Ole Bergesen & Georg
Parmann eds., 1994).
139. L.F.E. Goldie, Environmental Catastrophes and Flags of Convenience - Does the
Present Law Pose Special Liability Issues?, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 63, 82 (1991).
140. GAO REPORT, supra note 136, at 20.
141. Id.
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not effectively implemented MARPOL. Gerard Peet's report on
MARPOL enforcement, detailing state compliance with various
MARPOL requirements, 142 concludes that state compliance with
MARPOL should not be accomplished by new international
regulations but by effective enforcement of the existing
regulations.143 The Peet study looked at Article 11(e) and (f) of
MARPOL, which require annual reports delivered to the IMO about
the status of the convention. Only Australia had submitted reports
every year since MARPOL entered into force. 144 Seven countries
had submitted reports for every year excluding one and more than
30 parties had never submitted a report at all.145 Yearly reports,
though a bureaucratic formality, are crucial to the effective
implementation of MARPOL.146 The IMO needs sufficient data to
assess MARPOL's effectiveness, and if a member party is not
complying with such a simple procedural requirement as filing
reports there is cause for concern regarding compliance with other
more substantial requirements. 147 Therefore, the IMO should "name
and shame" noncompliant member states in order to ensure
compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements
mandated by MARPOL.
Lack of action by flag states can be incentivized through a
centralized processing system, proposed infra, that provides
statistics of enforcement actions taken by flag states. The Internet
site would include pending, resolved, and outstanding enforcement
actions. Regional MOUs could require flag states to submit
information about the outcome of the actions. This would eradicate
a culture of impunity that flag states encourage by naming and
shaming flag states that do not act on reported violations and by
publicizing noncompliant flag states through the Internet and
publications. IMO does not currently maintain a comprehensive
database of flag state enforcement, and accurate numbers are
needed to effectively understand and reform the MARPOL system.
The compilation and distillation of enforcement actions in one
centralized location will encourage studies that act as a call to arms
142. Peet, supra note 138.
143. Id. at 51.
144. Id. at 47.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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for effective Annex V enforcement.
MARPOL's lack of measures for monitoring state compliance
significantly prejudices its potential to achieve its objectives.148 IMO
should convene a subcommittee to assess MARPOL compliance.
The committee should look at the implementing legislation for
MARPOL, flag state responsiveness to reported violations,
compliance with regular reports on the status of MARPOL to IMO,
and port state inspection regimes, among other indicia. By
conducting a study measuring compliance with MARPOL, IMO will
gain a fuller understanding of where to most effectively target its
limited resources.
E. Lack of Enforcement by Port States
Port states are unable to directly enforce Annex V violations
because of the vast expanse of the territorial waters. The current
port state enforcement strategy is summed up in Gerard Peet's
study:
"[T]here was little chance that ships would be detected when
making illegal discharges at sea; when ships were seen while
illegally discharging at sea, there was little chance that they would
be brought before justice; when ships involved in unlawful
discharges were brought before justice, chances were small that
penalties would be given; and when penalties were given, these
would generally be very low and definitely not adequate in
severity to discourage MARPOL 73/78 violations." 149
While Peet's study focused on oil discharge under MARPOL,
his conclusions apply equally to marine debris. In an ideal world,
flag states would conduct all enforcement actions, and port states
would not have to police noncompliance.15 0 The Peet study also
looked at Article 4 of MARPOL, which requires contracting parties
to act upon violations of the requirements of MARPOL.151 In most
cases (1,077 out of 1,335 in the sample) the action is left up to the flag
148. Sheehy, supra note 58, at 454.
149. Peet, supra note 138, at 49-50 (citing M.J. Stoop, Olieverontreiniging door
schepen op de Noordzee over de periode 1982-1987, opsporing en vervolging (Oil Pollution
by Ships in the North Over the Period 1982-1987, Investigation and Prosecution 10
(1990) (only in the Dutch language; an English language summary was given in
IMO Document MEPC 29/10/3, 1990)).
150. Ozgayir, supra note 32, at 201.
151. Peet, supra note 138, at 48.
406 [Vol. 35:2
Open Oceans and Marine Debris
state.152 Of the remaining 258 cases, 68 reported pending action, 93
revealed insufficient evidence, 72 imposed a fine, and 12 took an
undetermined "another action."153  This data highlights the
ineffectiveness of the existing regulatory regime and the crucial role
of flag state enforcement against noncomplying vessels.
Recognizing that effective port state enforcement relies upon
incentives provided to mariners to discharge their garbage at port
reception facilities, port states must induce compliance by
conducting thorough on-board inspections. Pooling resources on a
regional level can address the lack of funds and technical equipment
at a port state level.154 Regional MOUs should actively assist other
member states by holding regular meetings and sharing knowledge
about inexpensive solutions to improve inadequate port reception
facilities.
Standardizing enforcement fines against ships will give port
states a reason to enforce MARPOL Annex V. The IMO should
create a system where the port state is able to collect against both a
flag state and ship operator for repeated violations involving
incomplete garbage logs, lack of placards, or lack of garbage
management plans. By creating a fine system that operates with a
strict liability tort theory, port states will actively pursue violators.
This would allow for enforcement fines regardless of a vessel or
state's culpability. An amendment should be made to MARPOL
and integrated into regional MOUs that allows states to collect a
predetermined amount of damages when a court proves ships have
dumped garbage.
The IMO should additionally incentivize port inspections by
allowing states that are parties to a regional MOU to receive more
representation at the IMO. This can be accomplished by
restructuring the IMO voting process to cater more toward regional
interests. Members within regional MOUs could hold each other
accountable for effective port state enforcement by providing
standards. Regional MOUs could also pool resources to improve
152. Id.
153. Id. at 48-49.
154. IMO, MEPC Circular 309, The Lack of Reception Facilities for Ship-Generated
Waste in Many Ports, available at http://www.ehikoo.com/ehikoo/browse
Tech.do?techTreeld=31911&1ang=en ("One reason given by many Members for
their lack of sufficient reception facilities is the cost involved. IMO decided to assist
in this matter and has established a Correspondence Group on a financing scheme
for reception facilities.").
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the port reception facilities for member states that do not have the
funds to provide effective port reception facilities.
Finally, IMO should provide further clarification to MARPOL
Article 7, which states that civil penalties may be brought against
port states that unduly delay ships.s55 The "undue delay" language
is meant to prevent overeager enforcers, but has the effect of
discouraging any enforcement at all. The broad language should be
narrowed to prevent port states operators from being sued for
conducting regular inspection processes.
F. Future MEPC Changes to Annex V
The Marine Environment Protection Committee adopted
amendments to Annex V at its July 15, 2011, meeting.15 6 The
amendments, which go into effect January 1, 2013, modify Annex V
by specifying that discharge of all garbage into the sea is prohibited,
except as expressly provided otherwise and by expanding the
requirements for placards and garbage management plans to fixed
and floating platforms.157  These amendments reflect a clear
realization by IMO that dumping from ships is per se damaging to
the environment and local economies. However, they do not fully
address the enormity of the problem of plastics in the marine
environment. As discussed previously, IMO should engage with
port and flag states, port operators, and ship owners to ensure
compliance with Annex V. Strict language in international
agreements is meaningless unless the standards are actually
enforced.
IV. Final Conclusions
Dumping of plastics into the ocean is a classic example of the
tragedy of the commons. Since there is not an effective regulatory
scheme to address garbage dumping, ships continue to discharge
largely unchecked. The difficulties surrounding the regulation of
marine plastics dumping are daunting. IMO must incentivize
compliance and enforcement, while recognizing the objections that
will erupt if IMO is viewed as an impediment to the free flow of
155. See MARPOL, supra note 37, art. 7.
156. Marine Environment Protection Committee Resolution 201(62) (July 15,
2011), available at http://www.amsa.gov.au/MarineEnvironmentProtection/
Revision ofAnnexes_I_andII ofMARPOL/MEPC201_62.pdf.
157. Id. reg. 3(1).
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goods across the seas. This note has addressed just a few of the
regulatory difficulties surrounding MARPOL Annex V and routes to
effectively improve them.
Scientists, politicians, regulatory agencies, and the media
should publicize the problems of marine dumping and the
concurrent dangers to human and marine animal populations on a
grand scale. Further research must also be done surrounding the
enforcement of MARPOL Annex V, and its relation to identifiable
harms perpetrated upon the global commons. Only if individuals
around the world know of the destructive effects of marine debris
on the ecosystem and human populations will the problem truly be
tackled. The global community must therefore reform the political
and economic factors underlying the ineffective regulatory structure
that allowed our oceans to be transformed into a garbage dumping
ground.
410 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 35:2
